

# Red China's Done

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IT WAS JUST a year ago that the conclusion of the test-ban treaty left China seemingly alone, confronted by two nuclear superpowers more openly hostile to her than to each other, shorn of the safety of conformity and the rewards of respectability and branded as a renegade and a spoiler for her refusal to go along.

The outlook seemed bleak. It was not the test ban itself that isolated China, to be sure. That had been achieved by other things: by the military action conducted or backed in India and Southeast Asia, by the spurning of the Sino-Soviet dispute from ideological into national channels and by the separate but parallel webs of diplomacy and propaganda spun out by both Moscow and Washington.

The treaty demonstrated, however, the costs of isolation. Here was a major international decision, with broad implications for the status and security of China, in which she had taken no part. Indeed, the treaty had had a sharp anti-China edge, since it was designed in part to discourage non-nuclear nations from getting their own bomb.

If it was one thing to be proud, the Chinese thus learned, it was another to be ignored; the flexing of national muscle and the beginning of economic recovery did not of themselves bring diplomatic recompense. China had not neglected her international knitting earlier, but the evidence is that she now set about with vigor to slip from the corner in which the test ban found and placed her.

HOW SUCCESSFUL has China been in this policy? What have been the results of a year's effort? The answers are necessarily imprecise but they tell a good deal about the possibilities and limitations of Chinese maneuvering in a world crowded with interests and power.

To those with a professional interest in such matters, China's movement from lonely eminence has been noticeable, even notable.

Even before the treaty was ratified, Chinese propaganda seized on it as a surrender to imperialism, as proof of Soviet unfitness to lead world communism and as a deal being made by the nuclear haves at Peking's expense. Chinese diplomacy reacted with a summons to a world summit conference to destroy all nuclear arms.

The dispatch of this summons was revealing: China had the recognition of fewer than 50 countries, and no United Nations access, and had to use the mails and airwaves to reach the rest. Only a few of China's clients accepted her appeal, which was allowed to trickle out. Presumably realizing that struggle against the test ban only emphasized her isolation, the Chinese Foreign Office toned down on that, too.

It was at this point that China invented a new concept for its strategic convenience. The concept was the "intermediate zone," including those nations in Western Europe and Japan that were capitalist but not hostile to China. The strategy was to outflank the nuclear giants and gain the diplomatic comforts and the commerce of other industrial countries.

THIS STRATEGY was rewarded last Jan. 27 with France's agreement to resume diplomatic relations. Like Peking, Paris had split with its alliance leader over a national bomb and had rejected the test ban. Recognition gave both countries a diplomatic coup and new leverage for prying into the politics of another hemisphere.

The act particularly aided the Chinese, giving them French aid for their dearest goal: the removal of American military power from Asia. One thing China lost, it may be noted, was the later chance to lead a propaganda chorus against fallout from French nuclear tests.

Elsewhere in the "intermediate zone," the pace has been less spectacular. With West Germany, China exchanged newsmen and at least hopes for more trade, but Bonn promised Washington to make no formal ties. Italy has shown interest but not eagerness to expand trade on an unofficial basis; likewise Portugal, whose colonial enclave of Macao on the mainland is welcomed

# Pretty Well



Ivey in the San Francisco Examiner

*"It's so nice to be popular!"*

(like Hong Kong) as a funnel for foreign exchange. China has just made a polite overture to Austria and sent five unofficial trade representatives to Japan.

Access to industrial goods and technology is apparently a major aim of

Peking, which can no longer count on Moscow for even the limited supplies that its struggling economy can put to use. Of China's estimated total trade of about \$3 billion in 1964, specialists guess that the free world's share will go up by 15 per cent. The promise,

# on Her Own

perhaps more than the reality, of this trade led Peking during the year to form a new commission for economic relations with foreign countries and to announce new regulations for foreigners' travel.

IN ASIAN LANDS which are not battlegrounds, China has sought not business but buffers. Since the test ban, Cambodia (which did not sign) has moved loudly and Burma quietly toward status as Chinese protectorates. Sweetened by a \$60 million aid package (largest of China's year), Pakistan provided Peking with its first meaningful air link to the outside world. Indonesia is expected to provide another air link soon.

France aside, China's most touted foreign ploy was its diplomatic debut in Africa. During and after Foreign Minister Chen Yi's tour, China picked up recognition from Tunisia, Burundi, Kenya, Zanzibar and Congo (Brazzaville). Official Washington doubted that the gains were real; others felt that the implications and future openings were large for a country sharing Africa's nonwhiteness, anticolonialism and hunger for growth.

More immediately, China got a toe-hold in Zanzibar, which later had a merger of sorts with Tanganyika, and last month pitched a splashy \$45 million aid offer to this African "Cuba." China thus bought the chance, as Russia had earlier in West Africa, to show its stuff in Africa. Sniping at another target of opportunity, China's diplomats in Burundi began to dabble in subverting the Congo.

One measure of China's courting was that she detached her claim for United Nations membership from the Africans' drive for fairer representation there, so as not to be blamed for denying them their due. Another was the renewed Russian interest in Africa. Some specialists feel, nonetheless, that these developments are bigger in print than in life and that China's designs in Africa exceed the resources available to serve them.

ON THE world Communist scene, China stepped out boldly during the year. For instance, she drummed the

pro-Soviet contingent out of the Japanese Communist Party, pushed it to the wall in North Viet-Nam and kept it quiescent in Cuba. Pro-Chinese Communists created or captured factions from New Zealand to Peru as Peking strove to form the separate world organization to go with the separate ideology already in place.

Reaching deep into the enemy camp, China got a windfall in Rumania, which for its own reasons shifted toward neutrality in the Communist dispute and thereby set a new example of maneuver and a new standard of nationalism.

Like Paris, Bucharest found China willing to be used for its own purposes, as a kind of political Everest on which to plant national pride. Teasing the Russian bear, Peking engaged in other operations in Eastern Europe which led Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to suspect her subversive hand. Similar operations, however, cost China almost her entire visible stake in Outer Mongolia, Moscow's only Asian satellite.

FROM THE United States, China got tough opposition of all sorts through the year, but more than that. The December speech of Roger Hilsman, then an Assistant Secretary of State, cautiously hinted at a future "policy of the open door" and thus held out to China the possibility of peaceful, stable relations once China's foreign ambitions are curbed.

The test ban, then, far from shipwrecking China, left her only temporarily beached. Not only did the Chinese avoid any permanent stigma, they got the comfort and company of France; they opened new countries and a new continent to their diplomacy and commerce; they softened relations with their accommodating neighbors and kept the pressure on the ones under their guns, and they stood up to the two great nuclear powers.

The test-ban treaty's first anniversary found China still weak and vulnerable but moving with determination, if not with even or quick results, toward a more pervasive role in the world.